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When a person with contagious measles has travelled 
by aircraft, European guidelines recommend contact 
tracing of passengers and crew within 5 days of expo-
sure for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), and within 
12 days of exposure for informing passengers and 
crew, in order to prevent further transmissions. To be 
effective, contact tracing requires prompt diagnosis, 
immediate notification of public health authorities and 
rapid availability of passenger contact data. We report 
two events of contact tracing initiated in Germany 
after two individuals with measles travelled on three 
international flights. In one event, contact tracing was 
initiated late because laboratory confirmation of a clin-
ically diagnosed measles case was awaited unneces-
sarily. Accessing passenger contact data was difficult 
in both events because of data protection issues with 
the airline which was not based in Germany. In both 
events, passengers were not reached in time to provide 
PEP, and one event resulted in at least two secondary 
measles cases. As all passengers were reached before 
the incubation period ended, tertiary cases were most 
probably prevented. Public health authorities and the 
transport sector must collaborate to resolve compet-
ing legal regulations for infection prevention and data 
protection, to simplify and accelerate identification of 
air travellers exposed to communicable diseases.
Introduction
Measles is an acute, highly infectious viral disease that 
is usually transmitted by direct contact with infectious 
droplets. Complications can include ear infections, 
pneumonia or encephalitis, and are more likely to occur 
in children younger than 5 years, or adults older than 
20 years. Measles cases are infectious from 4 days 
before to 4 days after the onset of rash [1]. Suspected 
or confirmed measles cases and laboratory detection 
of the measles virus in patient material are notifiable 
to local health authorities (LHA) in Germany under the 
Infection Protection Act [2]. The two-dose measles vac-
cination is safe, effective and a well establish standard 
in immunisation schedules all over Europe.
In 2017, several measles outbreaks, comprising 520 
confirmed cases, occurred in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW), Germany. Measles outbreaks were in that 
period also reported from other German federal states 
and several European countries [3].
With thousands of measles cases throughout Europe, 
it is not surprising that infectious persons travel using 
public transportation and aircraft. Owing to the infec-
tiousness of measles, transmission in aircraft and in 
transit areas of airports is possible [4-8].
Contact tracing after an exposure on a flight is not 
initiated automatically. European risk assessment 
guidelines for infectious diseases transmitted on air-
craft (RAGIDA) require that authorities apply a strong 
evidence-based rationale before initiating contact 
tracing [9]. For measles, contact tracing of all flight 
passengers and attendants is recommended, if “post-
exposure prophylaxis (PEP) can still protect susceptible 
persons, prevent complications, and limit further trans-
mission” [9]. Following the RAGIDA guidelines, contact 
tracing should be performed until Day 5 after exposure 
with the aim of providing PEP. Priority should be given 
to children younger than 2 years, pregnant women 
and immunocompromised contacts. If 6–12 days have 
passed since the flight, PEP is not likely to prevent ill-
nesses anymore and therefore RAGIDA recommends to 
only inform passengers and crew and manage cases 
and susceptible contacts. If more than 12 days have 
passed, no measures are taken.
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Public health authorities that initiate contact trac-
ing may encounter certain difficulties. Measles is 
likely to be diagnosed only after the index case has 
left the aircraft and has consulted a healthcare pro-
fessional. Some days may elapse before the LHA is 
made aware that a measles case has travelled by air-
craft. Therefore, contact tracing involves an immediate 
request for passenger lists from the airline, as the win-
dow for PEP administration is narrow (maximum 72 h 
for vaccination and 6 days for passive immunisation). 
According to German recommendations, post-exposure 
vaccination in adults is recommended for susceptible 
contacts born after 1970 [10]. Aircraft manifests are not 
standardised across airlines, and some airlines do not 
keep passenger lists for more than 48 hours [11]. Data 
protection issues can hamper the process of exchang-
ing passenger data between airlines and public health 
authorities [11,12]. Even where contact information 
is available, some passengers may not be reached in 
time for PEP [5].
The International Health Regulations (IHR) from 2005 
[13] were incorporated into national legislation in 
Germany in 2007 [14]. The IHR implementing law (IGV-
Durchführungsgesetz,  IGV-DG), entered into force 
in 2013 and specifies in Article 12(5) (on the basis 
of article 23 Number 1a IHR) that if a public health 
authority requests personal contact information of 
affected passengers or their possible contacts, the 
airline should provide the data without delay.
As regulated in the German Infection Protection Act, 
Articles 25 and 27–31 [2], LHAs in Germany are in 
charge of contact tracing. The overall approach is regu-
lated, but may vary between the 16 federal states of 
Germany. First informed are most often the LHAs of the 
district where the case lives or currently resides. This 
LHA can consult with other LHAs (e.g. the one respon-
sible for the airport where the aircraft landed), the fed-
eral state health authority or the Robert Koch Institute 
(RKI) as the national public health institute. They 
decide if contact tracing should be initiated and which 
LHA is in charge and they assign responsibilities in the 
contact tracing process. The LHA in charge requests 
passenger data directly from the airline. If data are 
provided, information about the measles exposure and 
contact data must be transferred securely to the health 
authorities of the passengers’ area of residence.
This ensures that (i) outbreak-preventing measures are 
implemented according to countries’ regulations and 
recommendations, (ii) language barriers are reduced 
and (iii) passengers can be provided with contact 
details of their competent health authority for further 
queries.
For passengers residing in Germany, the health author-
ity in charge can directly contact other LHAs or the 
respective federal state health authority. For pas-
sengers residing outside of Germany, the LHA may 
share information with public health authorities 
abroad via the established international channels: the 
IHR national focal points (NFP) or through the Early 
Warning and Response System (EWRS) for countries in 
the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/
EEA). The EWRS also has a mechanism to share per-
sonal data under current data protection regulations. 
As LHAs in Germany do not have access to EWRS, 
they need to request administrative assistance from 
the RKI. According to Article 12(7) IGV-DG [14], the RKI 
is allowed to transfer personal data of passengers if 
requested by the federal state level (usually by the cor-
responding ministry of health).
Here we report two events of contact tracing initiated 
in NRW, Germany, after two individuals with measles 
travelled on three international flights. We describe 
the challenges the public health authorities were con-
fronted with during the process and offer suggestions 
for improving the procedure for future cases.
Description of two contact tracing events
Event 1 (single flight)
In spring 2017 (Day 7, Friday), the NRW Centre for Health 
(state health authority; SHA) was informed by LHA 1 
about a potentially infectious 2 year-old child with 
measles who had flown from Romania to NRW 2 days 
earlier (Day 5) (Case 1,  Figure 1). Exanthema started 
4 days before the flight and Case 1 was clinically diag-
nosed with measles directly after the flight, without 
laboratory confirmation. The child had been visiting 
family in Romania, where a measles outbreak had been 
ongoing since January 2016 [15]. One family member in 
Romania had measles during the visit of Case 1. 
Figure 1
Timeline of events related to measles Case 1, North Rhine-
Westphalia, Germany, April 2017
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DE: Germany; NRW: North Rhine-Westphalia RO: Romania.
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Event 2 (outbound and return flight)
In spring 2017, LHA 2 informed the NRW SHA about a 
young adult with measles who had flown from NRW 
to Italy 7 days earlier (Case 2, Day 1, Tuesday,  Figure 
2). The exanthema started on the day of the outbound 
flight. From Italy, Case 2 travelled to France by car 
to attend an event in Monaco the next day. Case 2 
returned home via the same route on Day 3. A physi-
cian clinically diagnosed measles on Day 4 and notified 
LHA 2 who initiated laboratory testing. On Day 8, mea-
sles was confirmed by IgM antibodies and real-time 
quantitative PCR. Genotyping was subsequently per-
formed by the German national reference laboratory.
In both events, local and state health authorities 
decided to initiate contact tracing of flight passen-
gers and crew. The same airline was used for all three 
flights.
Contact tracing
Event 1 (single flight)
Two days after the flight (Day 7, a Friday) LHA 1 
requested data for passengers born after 1970 from the 
airport administration. The ‘Request Form for Passenger 
Contact Tracing’ published by the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) was used for the request 
[16]. On the evening of Day 7, the airport provided 
passenger data in the form of multiple screenshots 
and one list containing names, birth years and seat 
numbers. There were single screenshots for all 155 pas-
sengers that, however, were of poor image quality and 
had partly incomplete information (names, addresses, 
countries, phone numbers, email addresses) or incon-
sistent content (e.g. non-matching address and inter-
national call prefix). From the available information, 
LHA 1 staff tried during the weekend to determine the 
places of residence and corresponding public health 
authorities. The majority of passengers resided in 
NRW, but there were also passengers from three other 
German federal states, nine other EU/EEA countries, 
Serbia and Mexico.
LHA 1 was informed later on Day 7 that the airline main-
tained a separate register on children younger than 
2 years. There were none on the flight in question, but 
this information was not available until Sunday (Day 9).
For international passengers, the NRW SHA requested 
contacts of IHR NFPs for the respective countries from 
the RKI on Monday (Day 10). Contacts of LHAs in NRW 
were available at the NRW SHA and for other federal 
states, the respective SHAs were involved. The process 
of informing all health authorities in Germany and NFPs 
in other involved countries began on Monday (Day 10). 
However, transmitting personal passenger data to the 
health authorities was hampered by the lack of a secure 
and functional transfer system. Data were transferred 
by fax, which delayed the process for the international 
Figure 2
Timeline of events related to measles Case 2, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, April 2017
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passengers, as some fax numbers for NFPs were una-
vailable or invalid.
No secondary measles cases were reported that were 
linked to the flight of Case 1 from Romania to Germany.
Event 2 (outbound and return flight)
LHA 2 was informed about the possible measles case 
(Case 2) on Day 4, only 1 day after the return flight, but 
awaited laboratory confirmation before initiating con-
tact tracing. On Day 8, LHA 2 requested the passenger 
data from the airline. In agreement with the NRW SHA, 
passenger data was requested for the return flight only, 
because 7 days had passed since the outbound flight 
(Germany to Italy). Contact information for this purpose 
was not available on the airline’s website, therefore the 
LHA directed its request to the airline’s service centre, 
which was difficult and time-consuming.
Even though the index case was very probably highly 
infectious on both flights, the airline refused to pro-
vide passenger data, referring to the data protec-
tion law of the country where the airline was based. 
Furthermore, the airline stated that the list may contain 
“passengers who may or may not be linked in any form 
and may, therefore be irrelevant to the investigation you 
[the public health authority] are performing”. However, 
the airline itself offered to inform all passengers by 
email. As the window for PEP was closing at the end 
of that day, LHA 2 decided, in agreement with the NRW 
SHA and the RKI, not to insist further on the delivery of 
passenger data and accepted instead the airline’s offer 
to inform passengers of both flights by email. The text 
was prepared in English language in cooperation with 
the airline, LHA 2, the NRW SHA and the RKI. All pas-
sengers were advised to monitor themselves for typical 
signs and symptoms of measles and to contact their 
local healthcare provider immediately by phone if any 
symptoms occurred. All 53 LHAs in NRW and all other 
15 SHAs in Germany were informed about Case 2, and 
were requested to report to the NRW SHA any measles 
cases linked to any of this person’s two flights. The RKI 
informed other EU/EEA countries via EWRS.
The NRW SHA was informed about two secondary 
cases linked to the return flight of Case 2. Both had 
received information from the airline that they might 
have been exposed to measles. They developed exan-
thema 15 and 16 days after the flight, respectively 
(flight from Italy to Germany). One of the secondary 
cases resided in Rhineland-Palatinate (Case 3) and one 
in NRW (Case 4). The same genotype was detected in 
Case 3 and Case 2 (genotype D8, distinct sequence ID 
4807), supporting the hypothesis of transmission dur-
ing the flight. Case 4 was confirmed by antigen testing, 
but no genotyping was performed.
We did not receive information in either event about 
whether potentially exposed crew members were 
informed.
Discussion
Contact tracing is considered a reasonable interven-
tion, as measles can be transmitted in aircraft and both 
passengers and cabin crew are at risk. Early contact 
tracing leading to timely PEP is crucial, but it is unlikely 
that LHAs are able to perform contact tracing promptly 
enough. In both events described here, exposed pas-
sengers could not be reached in time and secondary 
measles cases resulted from the second event.
Contact tracing can be substantially delayed by multi-
ple factors, e.g. the lag between clinical diagnosis and 
notification to LHAs. When laboratory confirmation 
is sought, several more days may elapse. It is there-
fore advisable to consider contact tracing immediately 
upon notification of a clinically diagnosed case. If con-
tact tracing is initiated, reaching the airline to request 
a passenger list may be difficult and further delay the 
process, especially when public health authorities 
need to deal with airline service centres.
The German IHR Implementing Law (IGV-DG (Article 
12(5)) explicitly authorises LHAs to request and use 
personal data of air passengers from airlines in order 
to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Provision 
of passenger data in the context of contact tracing does 
not interfere with national data protection laws. In fact, 
facilitation of contact tracing by airlines is reinforced 
by several international conventions. Article 14 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 
Convention [17]), for example, states: “Each contract-
ing State agrees to take effective measures to prevent 
the spread by means of air navigation of […], and such 
other communicable diseases […]”’. The IHR address air-
lines as well: “[…] conveyance operators shall facilitate: 
[…] (d) provision of relevant public health information 
requested by the State Party” [13]. Similarly, a guide-
line from the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) recommends that airlines “[…] should comply 
with such a request in a timely manner, and cooperate 
fully with public health authorities […]” [18].
Nevertheless, airlines must protect passenger data 
from unauthorised access. This means that airlines are 
obliged to verify the request before providing passen-
ger data and ensure secure transfer in accordance with 
data protection regulations. The process of verification 
can substantially delay contact tracing activities and 
may render it impossible to retrieve the data in time to 
provide exposed passengers with PEP. A possible solu-
tion could be to establish dedicated staff at airports 
who mediate between the involved airline and public 
health authorities. In addition, technologies for secure 
online data sharing need to be established that are 
available to all (local) public health authorities.
Once LHAs obtain passenger information, another time-
consuming step is to contact all passengers. For Event 1 
described here, sharing information in the network of 
NRW health authorities and with other German SHAs 
was relatively easy. Nevertheless, health authorities 
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were reached only on the Monday following the initial 
information, which was too late for post-exposure vac-
cination. Reaching the other involved countries was 
more difficult: ca 1 week passed until all health author-
ities were informed.
For Event 2, the request for passenger data was unsuc-
cessful. The airline refused to share the data with ref-
erence to national data protection regulations. It was 
the same airline in both events, so it is remarkable that 
the airline provided passenger data for Event 1 but not 
Event 2. This may have resulted from the fact that LHA 1 
requested passenger data via the airport management, 
whereas in Event 2, LHA 2 had to contact the airline via 
their service centre. Since then, the same airline has 
never shared any passenger data again in two similar 
events we were involved in.
Nevertheless, the information the airline sent by email 
was effective and quickly reached all passengers. 
Earlier distribution of this information could have made 
a difference, since measles may spread before onset 
of symptoms and the time frame for PEP is narrow. 
When Case 3 and Case 4 developed symptoms, they 
were aware of their exposure to measles on the flight, 
and this could have been a factor in preventing tertiary 
cases.
If timely provision of passenger data is not possible, 
direct communication from the airline to passengers 
could be a reasonable option, especially under time 
pressure. The content of the information, however, 
must be agreed in advance and overseen by the respon-
sible public health authority. Since cabin crew might 
be at risk of measles infection as well, health authori-
ties should ascertain that information also includes 
exposed staff. As airlines will probably contact pas-
sengers in English language only, not all passengers 
may understand the content. This is an additional 
advantage of making passenger data available to the 
public health authorities who may want to communi-
cate directly with passengers, even if an email to the 
passengers has been sent out by the airline.
According to our experiences, contact tracing takes 
more time than expected according to RAGIDA. It may 
therefore be worth considering a revision of the guide-
lines on measles contact tracing. RAGIDA recommends 
performing contact tracing up to 5 days after the flight 
in question, assuming that at least 1 day is needed to 
get the data, reach the passengers or the responsible 
public health authorities and provide the passengers 
with PEP (passive immunisation is possible for up to 
6 days after exposure). This is hardly feasible, espe-
cially during the weekend. However, even if it seems 
impossible to perform contact tracing fast enough to 
provide PEP and prevent secondary cases, informa-
tion of passengers, crew and public health authorities 
after this time frame can still prevent tertiary measles 
cases. Our recommendations on efficient flight-related 
contact tracing upon notification of a measles case are 
listed in the Box.
As an interim solution, public health authorities should 
have information for potential contact persons at hand 
in order to provide adequate information. Ideally, such 
information would be available in multiple languages 
(e.g. the six official United Nations languages). Like 
the World Health Organization (WHO) passenger loca-
tor form, such documents could be provided via exist-
ing collaborations between the WHO, the ICAO and the 
IATA, such as the Collaborative Arrangement for the 
Prevention and management of public health events in 
Civil Aviation (CAPSCA) [19].
Public health authorities and airlines have the same 
goal: “to ensure safe and healthy air travel for passen-
gers which are travelers and crew members”  [20]. It is 
the role and responsibility of public health authorities 
to assess whether contact tracing should be initiated 
and which persons are to be defined at risk of expo-
sure or infection. The statement from the airline that 
some passengers might be irrelevant to the investiga-
tion clearly indicates an unnecessary conflict regarding 
the roles.
Conclusions
Collaboration between public health authorities and 
airlines is inevitable, and providing passengers with 
health information by email has proved to be practical. 
Nevertheless, the responsibility and expertise of pub-
lic health authorities is clearly defined and should not 
be abandoned.
Box
Recommendations for flight-related contact tracing upon 
notification of a measles case 
• PHAs should consider contact tracing immediately 
upon notification of a measles case.
• If PHAs decide to perform contact tracing, they should 
always request passenger data from the airline with 
the aim to provide timely PEP and to prevent tertiary 
cases.
• PHAs should prioritise children younger than 2 years, 
pregnant women and immunocompromised contacts, if 
this information is available.
• PHAs can consider contacting airport management if 
airline telephone service centres are not available.
• PHAs can ask airlines to inform exposed passengers 
and crew by email as an additional or alternative 
means of communication, if the airline does not 
provide passenger data in time.
• PHAs should approve the content of health-related 
information sent out by an airline. Ideally, templates 
would be available in multiple languages and 
advocated by international organisations like WHO and 
IATA.
• Dedicated contact persons at airports could mediate 
between airlines and PHAs and facilitate future contact 
tracing.
• Technologies for secure online data exchange need to 
be established and made available to PHAs.
IATA: International Air Transport Association; PHA: public health 
authority; PEP: post-exposure prophylaxis; WHO: World Health 
Organization.
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Health authorities have to be notified immediately 
when a possible measles case has travelled by air-
craft. Tracing of contacts must be started as soon as 
possible to be effective. Consequently, obtaining pas-
senger contact information from airlines needs to be 
improved. Technical means that comply with data pro-
tection regulations should be developed and deployed 
to enable secure data sharing between airlines and 
health authorities. Intersectoral efforts on regional 
and international level are needed to improve the cur-
rent situation, raise awareness among all stakeholders 
involved in contact tracing and facilitate the process of 
contact tracing in a way that public health remains a 
public responsibility.
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